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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2007, President George W. Bush signed the
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ("Mortgage Debt Relief
Act" or "MDRA") into law.1 As the title suggests, the Mortgage Debt
Relief Act assists homeowners affected by the housing mortgage crisis
that first hit the United States in 2005.2 The most significant part of the
legislation provides tax relief to homeowners who received a discharge
of their mortgage obligation from the banks after a loan modification or
foreclosure.3
It has been a long-established principle that debt forgiveness
constitutes gross income.4  The rationale for taxing discharged
indebtedness is that borrowed money is excluded from gross income due
to the borrower's offsetting obligation to repay his lender. In other
words, the loan proceeds increase the borrower's assets, but such
increase is entirely offset by the borrower's repayment obligation.
However, to the extent that any of the debt is forgiven, the rationale for
the initial exclusion disappears. Now, the borrower has received an
"accession to wealth" equal to the amount of cancelled debt.5
1. Pub. L.No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803 (2007).
2. "The Committee believes that where taxpayers restructure their acquisition debt on a
principal residence or [lost] their principal residence in a foreclosure, that it is inappropriate to treat
discharges of acquisition indebtedness as income." H.R. REP. No. 110-356, at 4 (2007).
3. See I.R.C. § 108 (2006).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) and I.R.C. § 61(a)(12)
(2006).
5. See, Yishai Beer, Unpacking the Cancellation of Indebtedness Doctrine: Toward
Economic Reality-Based Taxation, 19 VA. TAX REv. 457, 460 (2000). For a detailed discussion of
the concept of discharge of indebtedness income see, e.g., Boris 1. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson,
Income From the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
66 Cal. L. Rev. 1159 (1978); Alice Welt Cunningham, Payment of Debt With Property-The Two-
Step Analysis after Commissioner v. Tufts, 38 TAX LAW. 575 (1985); James S. Eustice,
Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tar: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14
TAX L. REv. 225 (1959); Stanley S. Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment
of Cancellation ofIndebtedness, 49 YALE L.J. 1153 (1940).
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Despite what seems an obvious and logical conclusion-that
discharge of debt produces an accession to wealth-this does not
necessarily translate into actual receipt of money from which the
taxpayer can pay the consequential income tax.6  The Supreme Court
first addressed this tax paradox in the business context in Bowers v.
Kerbaugh-Empire Co.7  The Court's ruling, that an insolvent business
who repays a loan for less than the amount borrowed does not have
gross income, became the prototype for the judicially-created insolvency
exception. Congress modified the tax relief developed by the courts in
the Revenue Act of 1939.9 However, rather than exclude the discharged
indebtedness, the Revenue Act of 1939 instituted a tax deferral method.
It allowed financially struggling businesses to reduce their debts without
incurring an immediate tax.10 However, the deferred tax was preserved
through a basis reduction in the businesses' assets, equal to the amount
of the debt relief. 11 This tax deferral provision, whose underlying policy
was designed to alleviate the sometimes harsh effect of treating
discharged indebtedness as gross income, eventually became section 108
of the Internal Revenue Code.
Following the policy of section 108, Congress, through the
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act,12 amended section 108(a)(1) by
adding subparagraph (E).1 3  The new Code provision relieves the tax
burden faced by homeowners whose mortgage debts were discharged
following a loan modification or foreclosure. In other words, Code
section 108(a)(1)(E) precludes the imposition of a federal income tax on
a homeowner after the discharge of mortgage debt on the home. 14
The fact that Congress took action to help homeowners avoid the
unexpected tax consequences of a discharged debt following a major
6. See H.R. REP. No. 76-855, at 23 (1939); S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 77-78 (1942).
7. 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926).
8. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862, 875 (1939) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 22(b)(9) (1939)).
10. I.R.C. § 22(b)(9) (1939). "This provision will materially aid . . . corporations whose
bonds can be purchased at the present time at less than their face value, giving them an incentive to
liquidate their indebtedness." H.R. REP. No. 76-855, at 4-5, reprinted in I J.S. SEIDMAN,
SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS 1236
(1954).
11. Treas. Reg. § 19.113(b)(3)-l (Supp. 1940).
12. Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803.
13. Section 108(a) provides a number of exceptions to section 61(a)(12).
14. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) provides that "[g]ross income does not include any amount which
(but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or
in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal
residence indebtedness which is discharged before January 1, 2013."
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economic crisis is not a new phenomenon. In the Revenue Act of 1939,
Congress offered tax relief to financially strapped businesses-victims
of the Great Depression-whose creditors discharged all or part of their
debt obligations.'I In the Farm Credit Relief Act of 1980, Congress
added section 108(a)(1)(C) to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to
prevent farmers affected by the credit crisis from incurring income tax
on the discharge of farm indebtedness. In other words, out of the Great
Depression came both the insolvency exception to discharge of
indebtedness income and section 108(a)(1)(B); out of the credit crisis of
1980 came section 108(a)(1)(C), which excludes qualified farm
indebtedness from gross income; and out of the current housing crisis
came section 108(a)(1)(E).
This article will explore the development of section 108, using the
three major economic crises mentioned above as a timeline. Part II
discusses the judicial debate of whether gross income should include
discharge of indebtedness. Part III discusses the development of the
insolvency exception following the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby
Lumber, which held that gross income includes discharge of
indebtedness. More specifically, it provides a discussion of court
decisions that carved out exceptions to Kirby Lumber to provide tax
relief to struggling businesses impacted by the Great Depression. This
part closes with a discussion of the codification of the insolvency
exception, under the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. Part IV will discuss
the history of the Farm Credit Crisis, its impact on farmers, and the
amendment to section 108, which offered tax relief to solvent farmers
whose debts were cancelled. Also, included in this part is a discussion
of some of the criticisms of the amended provision. Finally, Part V will
focus on the housing crisis, which led to the latest amendment to section
108. This part will explain the situation leading up to the housing
collapse, followed by a critique of its overall effectiveness.
II. DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS: GROSS INCOME OR NOT-ITS
COMPLICATED HISTORY
As referenced earlier, the issue of whether discharge of
indebtedness created gross income was first addressed by the United
15. The 1939 Revenue Act added paragraph (9) to section 22(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code allowing corporations in an "unsound financial condition" to settle their debts, in many cases
for pennies on the dollar, without incurring an income tax. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-
155, 53 Stat. 862, 875 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 22(b)(9) (1939)).
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States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.16 In
Kerbaugh-Empire, the taxpayer borrowed money from a German
bank, receiving $1,983,000. The taxpayer agreed to the bank's
condition to repay the loan in German marks or its equivalent in gold.19
Over the course of several years, the taxpayer made payments on the
loan. When the taxpayer made its final payment on the loan of
284,220.56 marks, that amount was worth $570,767.95 (American
dollars) less than at the time of the loan. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue took the position that the extent to which the German
marks decreased in value, $570,767.95, constituted gross income. The
Supreme Court, taking note that the taxpayer lost the money that it
borrowed in its business operations and that the business operations, as a
whole, resulted in a loss, determined that repayment of the entire amount
of the loan at a reduced amount did not result in income to the
taxpayer.21
The tax laws in effect, at the time of the Kerbaugh-Empire
decision, were broad enough for the Court to hold the debt reduction as
gross income.22 However, the Court declined to make such a finding.
Rather, the Court determined that in light of the company's poor
financial condition before and after the discharge, the discharge of
indebtedness did not meet the definition of income as articulated in one
of its earlier cases, Eisner v. Macomber.23 By making the company's
poor financial status the basis of its decision, the Kerbaugh-Empire court
16. 271 U.S. 170, 173 (1926).
17. Id. at 171. The taxpayer borrowed the funds from Deutsche Bank in Berlin, Germany. Id.
18. Id. at 172. In 1913, $1,983,000 equaled 8,341,337.50 German marks (approximately
4.206 marks equaled I dollars or I mark equaled .23 dollars). Id.
19. Id. at 172.
20. Id at 173. German marks that were worth over 4 cents per mark in 1911, were worth 2 V2
cents per mark in 1921. The amount, 284,220.56 marks, depreciated in value from $798,144.41 at
the time of the loan, to $113,688.23. (This figure can be determined through the process of
deduction. The case states that the difference between the amount borrowed at the time the loan
was made and the amount paid was $684,456.18. The taxpayer paid $113,688.23. So the combined
amounts, $793,144.41, equal the value of the marks in 1911, when the taxpayer first borrowed the
funds). Id.
21. Id. at 175 ("When the loans were made and notes given, the assets and liabilities of [the
taxpayer] were increased alike. The loss of the money borrowed wiped out the increase of assets,
but the liability remained. The assets were further diminished by payment of the debt. The loss was
less than it would have been if marks had not declined in value, but the mere diminution of loss is
not gain, profit, or income.").
22. Revenue Act of 1921 § 213, Pub. L. No. 98, 42 Stat. 227, 237-38. The Act provided that
gross income "includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal service . . .of whatever kind and in whatever form paid. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
23. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 193 (1920) (overruled).
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carved out an exception to what, a few years later, would become the
general rule that gross income includes discharge of indebtedness.
On the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Kerbaugh-Empire
came Appeal of Meyer Jewelry Co.24 As in Kerbaugh-Empire, the
Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA")25 determined that the definition of
income did not include a taxpayer's discharge of indebtedness.26 Meyer
Jewelry also involved a taxpayer-business experiencing financial
hardship. As a result of the company's financial downturn, its creditors
agreed to reduce their claims against the company by $52,817.03. On
audit, the Bureau of Internal Revenue27 determined the company to be
liable for the tax, based on the amount of the discharged debt.
The BTA, after a thorough discussion of Congress' intent "to
exercise its power to the full extent granted by the Constitution[J" 28
held that such "cancellation of the taxpayer's indebtedness [did] not
constitute income."29 It reasoned:
It is true the taxpayer has been relieved from paying an amount to its
creditors by their common consent, an amount which the evidence
shows it could not have in fact paid whether voluntarily relieved of
payment or not. Its balance sheet will disclose a more favorable
financial condition, but 'enrichment through increase in value of
capital investment is not income in any property meaning of the term.'
That the taxpayer received a benefit in the sense of being able to
continue its business may be conceded, but such an opportunity can
not constitute gain or income, within the meaning of the Constitution
and the Revenue Acts. It is not believed that relief from paying an
obligation, under the circumstances set forth in this case, constitutes
income, and it is our opinion that it is not taxable under the statute.30
The court noted that the taxpayer had been relieved of a debt "it
could not have in fact paid." 31 The statement shows that the court
considered the taxpayer's poor financial condition to be a compelling
24. 3 B.T.A. 1319 (1926).
25. The Board of Tax Appeals was the predecessor of the current Tax Court. BTA cases were
published in Reports of the United States Board of Tax Appeals (1924-1942) and Board of Tax
Appeals Memorandum Decisions (1928-1942).
26. Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. at 1323.
27. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is the former name of the Internal Revenue Service.
28. Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. at 1321.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1322-23 (noting the taxpayer's debt relief did not add anything to his worth)
(internal citation omitted). See also John F. Campbell Co. v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 458, 459-60
(1929) and Senner v. Comm'r, 22 B.T.A. 655, 657-58 (1931).
31. Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. at 1322.
[26:6974 AKRON TAX JOURNAL
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factor in deciding that the discharge of indebtedness did not result in
-32
gross income.
The courts' refusal to impose an income tax liability on the
discharge of indebtedness for businesses struggling financially continued
in Appeal of Independent Brewing Company of Pittsburgh where the
BTA addressed the issue of whether the taxpa er had taxable income
from the purchase of its own mortgage bonds for less than what the
company owed.
The BTA found Kerbaugh-Empire controlling and held that the
amounts discharged were not income due to the financial condition of
the taxpayer at the time of the discharge. It stated: "The facts are
simply that during the taxable year[,] the taxpayer used a portion of its
cash on hand to pay a portion of its debts. Whether it will ever be able to
pay the balance of them is uncertain."35 While the court did not use the
phrase "poor" or "unsound" financial condition, the phrase, "whether it
will ever be able to pay the balance," 36 implies that it considered the
company to be struggling financially, for only a taxpayer who is in a
poor financial condition would be able to pay only part of its debt,
leaving uncertain its ability to pay the balance.
By 1926, a rule had formed regarding the taxability of discharge of
indebtedness with respect to companies in an unsound financial
condition: the discharge of indebtedness of a financially struggling
business is not income. Many subsequent debt discharge cases followed
this general rule. 37 The establishment of the general rule could not have
been timelier. More businesses would come to rely on this rule in only a
few short years as America entered into the worst economic climate of
all time-the Great Depression.
32. See also Simmons Gin Co. v. Comm'r, 16 B.T.A. 793, 797 (1929) ("We held in the
Appeal of Meyer Jewelry Co. . . . that the amount of indebtedness canceled by the creditors of an
insolvent person did not constitute income to the debtor.").
33. Appeal of Indep. Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh, 4 B.T.A. 870, 873 (1926).
34. A mortgage bond is a bond secured by a mortgage on one or more assets. These bonds
are typically backed by real estate holdings and/or real property, such as equipment. In a default
situation, mortgage bondholders have a claim to the underlying property and could sell it off to
compensate for the default. Mortgage Bond, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mortgagebond.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
35. Indep. Brewing Co. ofPittsburgh, 4 B.T.A. at 873-74 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 874.
37. See Nat'l Sugar Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 7 B.T.A. 577, 578 (1927) (holding that the purchase
of second mortgage bonds for less than face value was not taxable income to an insolvent taxpayer);
Simmons Gin Co., 16 B.T.A. at 798 (concluding that the forgiveness of $119,927.24 for an insolvent
person should not be included in gross income); John F. Campbell Co. v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 458,
460 (1929) (holding that $50,087.51 in debt relief was not income, finding facts indistinguishable
from Meyer Jewelry Co.); Progress Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 234 (1930).
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III. THE GREAT DEPRESSION, KIRBY DOCTRINE, AND THE JUDICIALLY-
CREATED INSOLVENCY EXCEPTION
The Great Depression was the result of numerous factors, not just
the Stock Market Crash, which occurred on Tuesday, November 29,
1929. One scholar lists: "the adherence to the gold standard; the raising
of interest rates by the Federal Reserve at an inopportune time in an
attempt to stem the stock market speculation prior to the Great
Depression; a decline in consumption that caused decline in the stock
market; and a series of banking crises," 38 as major causes of the Great
Depression.
Among the casualties of the Great Depression were businesses.
Many businesses went bankrupt. Those businesses that managed to stay
afloat were provided lifelines by their creditors, who cancelled part or all
of the businesses' debts. Discharging a part of the businesses' debt
obligations kept the companies out of bankruptcy and offered creditors
the prospect of recouping some of their money.39  However, during
1931, while America continued to suffer from the dreadful effects of the
Great Depression, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co,40 holding that discharge of
indebtedness constituted gross income.41 The decision threatened to
overturn Kerbaugh-Empire and its progeny,42 thereby affecting those
surviving businesses whose debts were reduced or cancelled by their
creditors.
In Kirby Lumber, the taxpayer distributed its own bonds and
received more than $12 million from bondholders, thereby making it
obligated to those bondholders for the same amount. In the same year,
38. Darren M. Springer, Reimaging the WTO: Applications of the New Deal as a Means of
Remedying Emerging Global Issues, 29 VT. L. REV. 1067, 1075 (2005) (citing Christina D. Romer,
The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 28 (1993)).
39. There were other reasons creditors found it beneficial to discharge all or a part of the debt:
"A bank in receivership anxious to terminate its affairs may prefer to accept sixty to seventy-five
cents on the dollar rather than institute litigation or foreclosure [or] a creditor may hope to induce
future purchases from his debtor by canceling an obligation of the latter." Surrey, supra note 5, at
1156.
40. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 (1931).
41. Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 44 F.2d 885, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1930), rev'd, United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931).
42. See Simmons Gin Co. v. Comm'r, 16 B.T.A. 793, 798 (1929) (holding reduction in debt
was not income to the company because the taxpayer was insolvent); Progress Paper Co., 20
B.T.A. at 235. In Progress Paper, the taxpayer experiencing financial problems had his debts
reduced by his creditors (a reduction of $49,886). The BTA held that "the forgiveness or
cancellation of a debt, in whole or in part, by a creditor does not result in income to the debtor." Id.
at 236.
[26:6976
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1923, Kirby Lumber repurchased those bonds for roughly $137,000 less
than what the bondholders paid. Upon repurchasing the bonds, Kirby
Lumber had no further financial obligation to the bondholders. The
Court of Claims disregarded the taxpayer's financial condition before
and after the discharge, finding its financial status to be immaterial.43 it
then determined that no gross income resulted from the forgiveness of
the debt.4 However, the Supreme Court found the taxpayer's financial
position after the discharge a compelling factor, and found that Kirby
Lumber had income from the discharge of indebtedness in the amount
$137,000. It reasoned:
Here there was no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear
gain. As a result of its dealings, it made available $137,521.30 assets
previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct. We see
nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions. The
defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income,
if we take words in their plain popular meaning as they should be taken
here.45
In finding that the taxpayer's discharge of indebtedness resulted in
taxable income, the court created what is today an established principle:
gross income includes discharge of indebtedness. However, it did not
overturn Kerbaugh-Empire. In fact, a closer reading of Kirby Lumber
shows that the Court actually followed the reasoning in Kerbaugh-
Empire, focusing on the company's financial position after the
discharge. With Kirby now standing for the proposition that gross
income includes discharge of indebtedness, it relegated the rule set out in
Kerbaugh-Empire to an exception.
By the late 1930s, it was well-established that taxpayers who were
insolvent before being discharged of a debt and remained insolvent
subsequent to the discharge could exclude the discharged amount from
gross income. 46 At the same time, taxpayers who were solvent before
43. Kirby Lumber Co., 44 F.2d at 887 ("In our opinion, the question whether the person
engaging in such transaction is solvent or insolvent, or whether he made a profit or suffered a loss,
through the use of the money for which the obligations were issued, is wholly immaterial.").
44. Id.
45. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
46. See Appeal of Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. 1319, 1323 (1926); Burnet v. John F.
Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1931); E.B. Higley & Co. v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 127
(1932); Towers & Sullivan Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 922, 924 (1932); Quinn v. Comm'r, 31
B.T.A. 142, 145 (1934); Simmons Gin Co., 16 B.T.A. at 797, Eastside Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 18
B.T.A. 461, 465 (1929); Progress Paper Co., 20 B.T.A. at 236; Madison Rys. Co. v. Comm'r, 36
B.T.A. 1106, 1109 (1937) ("[W]here an insolvent debtor satisfies a portion of his debts without
thereby becoming solvent, he has likewise realized no taxable income. He has not by such
201l]1 77
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and after the discharge were required to include in their gross income the
amount of the discharge. 47 What remained unclear was whether Kirby
Lumber or Kerbaugh-Empire applied in cases where creditors cancelled
the indebtedness of a taxpayer, who were insolvent before the discharge
and who became solvent immediately upon the discharge. The issue was
addressed in Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner.V
In Lakeland Grocery, the insolvent taxpayer had assets worth
approximately $55,000, but liabilities exceeding $100,000. The
taxpayer's creditors, "to permit [it] to remain in business,, 49 agreed to
accept $15,472.61 in complete cancellation of its debt, leaving the
taxpayer with $39,596.93 of assets free and clear from the claims of
creditors. While noting that the taxpayer "was hopelessly insolvent,"
before the discharge, the BTA viewed the once encumbered, but now
freed assets, as gross income. In other words, the taxpayer was solvent
to the extent that its assets were not subject to the claim of creditors
($39,596.93), thereby making Kirby Lumber applicable.51
Just when it appeared that Lakeland Grocery put the nail in the
coffin for solvent, but struggling, businesses, Congress finally stepped
in. In 1939, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1939 to provide tax
relief to insolvent and solvent-but-struggling businesses. The Act
amended then section 22(b) by adding paragraph 9.53 It stated the
following:
A corporation which establishes to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that it is in an unsound financial condition may redeem
its bonds, notes, or other evidence of indebtedness . . . at less than their
face value without recognition of gain if such redemption occurs ... 54
satisfaction of his debt realized 'something of exchangeable value,' something 'for his separate use,
benefit, and disposal."'); Transylvania R.R. v. Comm'r, 99 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir. 1938).
47. B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 26 B.T.A. 1393, 1400 (1932); White v. Comm'r, 34
B.T.A. 424,428 (1936), affdsub nom., Walker v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1937).
48. 36 B.T.A. 289, 290 (1937).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 292.
51. Id. "The Board in Madison Railways, thereafter applied its insolvency rule to the case of
a purchaser of bonds which was insolvent, both before and after the purchase, to hold that no
income resulted from the purchase." Surrey, supra note 5, at 1160.
52. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862, 875 (to be codified at I.R.C. §
22(b)(9) (1939)).
53. Revenue Act of 1939, I.R.C. § 215(a).
54. H.R. REP.No. 76-855, at 5(1939).
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Based on section 22(b)(9), corporations did not have to establish
insolvency before or after the discharge of debt.55  So long as the
corporation found itself in an "unsound financial condition," it could
exclude the cancelled debt from gross income. A corporation could
establish that it was in an "unsound financial condition" simply by
showing that its encumbered property had greatly depreciated in value
from the date the debt was incurred to the time of the discharge. 56
Even with the new tax provision extending relief to taxpayers who
otherwise would have income from discharge of indebtedness under
Kirby Lumber, some businesses still did not meet the standards. This is
because section 22(b)(9) applied only where the debt was evidenced by a
security. Struggling businesses whose unsecured debts were forgiven
could not benefit from the newly added tax provision. Courts trying to
help these struggling businesses get around Kirby Lumber, or at least
reduce the amount of discharge of indebtedness income, created new
theories designed to exclude discharges of indebtedness from gross
income. The theories included: (1) the net assets test; (2) purchase price
debt reduction theory; and (3) the gift theory.
A. Net Assets Test: Defining Insolvency
Trying to determine whether Kerbaugh-Empire or Kirby Lumber
applied depended, in large part, on the insolvency of the taxpayer. A
taxpayer was considered solvent if he had "net assets" after the debt
cancellation (assets that were no longer subject to the claims of
creditors). Conversely, a taxpayer was considered insolvent if he had
"net liabilities" (liabilities in excess of assets). However, in the case of
Cole v. Commissioner,57 the BTA helped struggling businesses reduce
the amount of discharge of indebtedness income by holding that items
55. "It is not necessary ... that a corporation must establish that its liabilities exceed its assets
or it is unable to meet its current obligations as they fall due." Id. at 23-24.
56. By 1942, Congress removed the requirement that the corporation had to be in an unsound
financial condition at the time of discharge. "Your committee believes these restrictions
unnecessarily strict and that they deny the benefits of this section in many meritorious cases." S.
REP. No. 77-1631, at 46 (1942), reprinted in 108 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS 46 (1979). The change permitted both financially sound and unsound corporations to
exclude discharges of debts from being included in the calculation of their gross income. By 1954,
section 22(b)(9) became section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 108 abolished
the requirement that a security evidence the note and extended it to individuals. See I.R.C. § 108
(1954).
57. 42 B.T.A. 1110, 1113 (1940), superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 108(d)(3) (1986), as
recognized in Carlson v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 87 (T.C. 2001). See infra note 86.
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exempt from the claims of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings would
also be excluded from the assets used to determine a taxpayer's
solvency.58
In Cole, the taxpayer's employer advanced him over $100,000 so
that he could pay off a very significant debt. By 1935, the taxpayer
owed $62,000 on the advance. The taxpayer's employer offered to
discharge the remaining balance on the debt obligation, if he resigned
from the company. Immediately before the debt cancellation, the
taxpayer had assets totaling $29,559.57, consisting of cash, stock,
securities, equity in his home, and net equity in ten life insurance
policies. The taxpayer's liabilities immediately before the debt
cancellation totaled $68,013.50, which included the $62,000 of debt
owed to his creditor.59
In determining the taxpayer's net assets after the cancellation of
debt, i.e., "the amount of [taxpayer's] assets which ceased to be offset by
claims of creditors," the BTA excluded the taxpayer's net equity in his
ten life insurance policies totaling $19,515.62 because under New York
law, as applicable at the time of the debt cancellation, the equity in the
policies was exempt from the claims of creditors. Accordingly, the court
determined that, immediately before the taxpayer's discharged
indebtedness, his assets totaled $10,043.95 and his liabilities totaled
$68,013.50. Immediately after the discharge, the taxpayer's liabilities
decreased to $5,526.38. Applying the Kirby Lumber rule, the Board of
Tax Appeals held that the taxpayer was solvent to the amount of
$4,517.57, the difference between his $10,043.95 of assets and the
$5,526.38 of liabilities.61 Had the $19,515.62 of equity in the taxpayer's
life insurance policies been included in his assets, the taxpayer would
have been determined solvent to the extent of $24,033.19, which would
have constituted discharge of indebtedness income.62
B. Purchase Price Reduction Exception
Under this theory, when the debtor borrows money to purchase
property and the lender subsequently reduces the debt obligation to
reflect the property's reduced value, the reduction in the debt obligation
58. Cole, 42 B.T.A. at 1113.
59. Id.at 1110-11.
60. Id. at 1113.
61. Id. at 1114.
62. See also Marcus Estate v. Comm'r., 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 38 (1975).
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does not generate gross income.63 Rather, the debt reduction will result
in a price reduction on the property equal to the decreased debt.64 The
taxpayer would have discharge of indebtedness income only to the
extent that the debt reduction exceeded the property's value.65 The
purchase price reduction exception was first articulated in Hirsch v.
Commissioner.66
In Hirsch, the taxpayer purchased property in 1922 for $29,000,
using $10,000 of his own funds and borrowing $19,000. The $19,000
loan was secured by the property, so the taxpayer had a mortgage debt of
$19,000. From the time of the property's purchase, it declined in value,
and by 1929 had a value of $8,000. Between 1922 and 1929, the
taxpayer paid a total of $4,000 on the loan, still owing the creditor
$15,000. The creditor rejected the taxpayer's offer to satisfy the
remaining balance by conveying the $8,000 property in return for full
satisfaction of the indebtedness. However, the creditor counter-offered,
stating that it would accept $8,000 in satisfaction of the $15,000
outstanding balance. Hirsch accepted the counter-offer with the result
being that he was able to keep the property, for which he paid a total of
$22,000 ($10,000 of his own cash plus $12,000 payment to his creditor),
after forgiveness of the $7,000 balance of the loan. The BTA sided with
the Commissioner, agreeing that such forgiveness of indebtedness was
.67gross income.
On appeal, it was apparent from the third paragraph of the Seventh
Circuit's opinion as to how it would view the forgiveness of the $7,000.
It quoted a prior case that commented on the current condition of the
economy: "It being apparent . .. that instead of being a harvest time of
profits for the taxpayer, the year 1929 . . . was just the opposite, and to
say that anything moved to him by way of gains, profits, or income was
'simply paradoxical.",68 Thus, BTA viewed the facts in the following
63. "The reduction in purchase price exception reflects a tendency to consider a transaction in
its entirety and not exclusively on the debt reduction feature. In effect, this exception permits the
decline in value of the debtor's property to offset and eliminate the benefit resulting from the partial
discharge of the obligation." TMFEDPORT No. 540 § II, p. 25 (BNA) (2008).
64. The tax effect of reducing the basis in the property is that the taxpayer on a subsequent of
sale of the property will realize a larger gain, if the sales price exceeded the price of the reduced
basis, or a smaller loss if the taxpayer were unable to sell the property for more than the basis.
65. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 1934); L.D.
Coddon & Bros. Inc. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 393, 398-99 (1938).
66. 115 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940).
67. Id. at 657-58.
68. Id. at 657.
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way: The taxpayer paid $29,000 for the property. Of that amount, the
taxpayer borrowed $19,000, which he was under an obligation to repay.
Then came the depression; the value of his purchased asset shrunk to
$8,000. It was not yet fully paid for; it was not worth paying for; it
could not be sold for enough to satisfy the balance remaining unpaid
on the purchase price. Caught in this dilemma he negotiated for and
secured a reduction of $7,000. True, this was a forgiveness of
indebtedness, but more than that, it was in essence a reduction in
purchase price from $29,000 to $22,000.69
Thus, the court held that the Board of Tax Appeals decision to be
"reversed and remanded, with directions to compute the tax upon the
basis of exclusion of $7,000, representing the voluntary reduction in the
purchase price."70
C Gift Exception
In another move by the courts to avoid the income tax
consequences from the discharge of indebtedness during hard economic
times, the courts held that such forgiveness of indebtedness could be a
gift. Gifts have been held to be excluded from gross income, since the
income tax was first imposed.7 1 Helvering v. American Dental Co. 72
was the first case to apply the gift exclusion in the discharge of
indebtedness context arising in a business setting.
In American Dental, the taxpayer-corporation owed accrued
interest and back rent. The taxpayer's creditors reduced both the
interest, which had been accruing since 1933, and the back rent. A total
of $25,219.65 was discharged. There was no indication that the taxpayer
was insolvent at or before the debt cancellation, nor was there an
indication that the taxpayer was insolvent afterwards. Because of the
absence of the taxpayer's insolvency, the Commissioner included the
$25,219.65 as income on the taxpayer's 1937 income tax return.73
The taxpayer disputed the asserted deficiency, arguing that the
discharges were gifts that were exempt from tax. The BTA found that
69. Id. at 658.
70. Id. at 659. Cases following Hirsch included Allen v. Courts, 127 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir.
1942); Helvering v. A.L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1942); Gehring Publ'g Co. v.
Conm'r, I T.C. 345, 354 (1942); Conm'r v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1943); Fifth Ave.-
Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1944).
71. See 11(B) of the 1913 Revenue Act, 38 Stat. 114 at 167. Gross income does not include
"the value of property acquired by gift." Id.
72. Helvering v. Am. Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1943).
73. Id. at 323-24.
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the cancellations were not gifts and held in favor of the Commissioner.74
The appellate court reversed the Board's holding, finding that such debt
forgiveness was in fact a gift.75  The Commissioner appealed the
decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court held the
debt forgiveness to be "gratuitous, a release of something to the debtor
for nothing, and sufficient to make the cancellation here gifts within the
statute." 76
D. Codification of the Judicially-Created Exceptions: Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980
By 1980, one thing was clear: a taxpayer realized income from the
discharge of indebtedness. However, what remained unclear were the
circumstances in which a taxpayer could exclude discharge of
indebtedness from gross income. Courts continued to apply the
insolvency exception, which had been codified in 1954, as Code section
108 of the Internal Revenue Code.77  However, other judicially-created
exceptions to Kirby Lumber had not been codified and continued to be
applied on a case-by-case basis.
74. See Am. Dental Co. v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 425, 428-29 (1941), rev'd, 128 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir. 1942). The Board held: "No evidence was introduced to show a donative intent upon the part
of any creditor. The evidence indicates, on the contrary, that the creditors acted for purely business
reasons and did not forgive the debts for altruistic reasons or out of pure generosity." Am. Dental
Co., 44 B.T.A. at 428.
75. See Am. Dental Co., 128 F.2d at 256. "[T]he indebtedness was cancelled for the benefit
of the debtor and without consideration, and was not taxable." Id.
76. Am. Dental Co., 318 U.S. at 331. "The application of the gift exclusion in the case of debt
cancellations arising in a business setting has been extremely rare." Nicolas J. Bakatsias & Keith A.
Wood, The Increased Relevance of the Cancellation of Indebtedness Rules in Today's Economic
Environment, http://www.tiny.cc/18wui. See also Capitol Coal Corp. v. Comm'r, 250 F.2d 361, 363
(2d Cir. 1957); Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1951) (holding
no gift where a solvent debtor settled federal excise claims and the amounts due on bonds); Spear
Box Co. v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 844, 846 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding no gift where notes were purchased
at discount); Marshall Drug Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 820, 822 (Ct. Cl. 1951) (holding no
gift where trade creditors cancelled indebtedness of accrual basis corporation for less than amount
due). But see Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322, 326 (8th Cir. 1951) (finding that the cancellation of
previously deducted back rent in connection with the renewal of a lease was a gift is not clearly
erroneous). Bakatsias & Wood, supra, at 8 ("Nevertheless, it remains at least a possible contention
by a debtor seeking to avoid discharge of indebtedness income, particularly in view of the Supreme
Court's stated willingness in alleged "gift" cases to accept the findings of the triers of fact with
respect to the element of donative intent, even as to transactions which occur in the commercial
sphere."). Section 108 contains no statutory language prohibiting the gift exclusion in the case of
debt cancellations. Nevertheless, both the House and the Senate Reports contain the following
language: "it is intended that there will not be any gift exception in a commercial context to the
general rule that income is realized on discharge of indebtedness." H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 15 n.21
(1980) and S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 19 n.22 (1980).
77. See Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 730.
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An attempt to clear up the confusion concerning the exceptions
came about in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ("BTA 1980"). 7 BTA
1980 substantially amended Code section 108 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. The "new" section 108 provided that taxpayers would
not realize gross income from the discharge of indebtedness during
79 80bankruptcy, insolvency, or where the indebtedness was "qualified
business debt." ' BTA 1980 also codified the purchase price reduction
exception and the definition of insolvency for purposes of the net
assets test. The gift exception, however, was neither codified nor
overturned.
BTA 1980 also added a very significant provision, code section
108(e)(1). It provided, in part that "there shall be no insolvency
exception from the general rule that gross income results from discharge
of indebtedness." 85 This halted further expansion of the Kirby Lumber
exceptions by the courts. No longer could courts get around Kirby
Lumber by creating more exceptions as they did during the Great
Depression. Therefore, if a taxpayer received a discharge of
indebtedness and was not bankrupt or insolvent at the time of the
discharge, such indebtedness did not constitute "qualified business
indebtedness," or result in a purchase price reduction, the taxpayer had
gross income under Code section 61(a)(12). 86
As with the timing of the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby
Lumber, the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 came about at the worst time
for farmers. Due to the limitation created under Code section 108(e)(1),
solvent farmers would be subjected to taxation under Kirby Lumber as
they faced the Farm Credit Crisis of the 1980s.
78. Pub. L. No. 96-589 § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389 (1980).
79. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (1986).
80. Id. § 108(a)(1)(B).
81. Id. § 108(a)(1)(C). This provision was identical to the old section 108, allowing solvent
individuals to exclude from gross income discharges of indebtedness income, if the indebtedness
was incurred in connection with property used in the taxpayer's trade or business.
82. Id. § 108(e)(5). However, it limited it only to instances where the seller of the property
reduced the purchase price. Thus, a debtor had discharge of indebtedness income when third-party
lenders, i.e., banks and other lending institutions, reduced the purchase price.
83. Id. § 108(d)(3). However, it was not until a few years later that a court decision held
assets exempt from the claims of creditors were included for purposes of determining insolvency,
thus overruling Cole v. Comm'r, 42 B.T.A. 1110 (1940).
84. However, the 1960 Supreme Court case, Commissioner v. Duberstein, would make it
nearly impossible for a business to use the gift exception to exclude discharge of indebtedness from
gross income. 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
85. I.R.C. § 108(e)(1).
86. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2006).
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IV. EcoNOMIC CRISIS: THE FARM CREDIT CRISIS OF THE 1980S.
RESPONSE: SECTION 108(A)(1)(C)
To understand what caused the farm credit crisis in the 1980s is to
understand the events of the previous decade. The 1970s were profitable
years for the American farmer. This was, in large part, due to inflation
and an increased demand by foreign countries for United States
agricultural products. 7  With the increased demand, farm prices and
farm incomes skyrocketed. With the soaring prices and incomes, the
value of farmland significantly appreciated. However, part of the land
appreciation was artificial, due to relaxed banking standards and an
increase in the loans offered by numerous lending institutions. 89
Many farmers expanded production to profit from the record farm
prices. They took out loans to purchase additional land-highly-
appreciated land.90 In most cases, the farmers used the equity in their
existing land to secure the loans. Low interest rates made borrowing an
easy choice for the farmers. 9 1 In addition, the deregulation of the
banking industry by Congress made it very easy for farmers to qualify
for the loans. The deregulation resulted in an increase in lenders who, in
turn, competed with one another for farm customers.92 Vying for the
farmer's business, agricultural lenders loaned money to the farmer for
far more than what the farmer needed or requested. Most farmers had
no difficulty obtaining a loan, as the lenders made qualifying very easy,
basing it on the property's future appreciation, rather than the farmer's
income.94 As a result of this over-borrowing and liberal lending, total
farm indebtedness increased from $52,755 million to $178,708 million
87. Countries like India, China, and the Soviet Union were purchasing United States farm
products to make up for their own agricultural shortages. "People in foreign countries wanted
American food and they had the money to pay for it, so foreign markets became important to the
farmers." CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE, http://www.nebraskastudies.org/1000/stories/1001_0100.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
88. Net farm income doubled in just a matter of three years, from 1970 to 1973, from $14.4
billion to $34.4 billion. CLIFTON B. LUTTRELL, THE HIGH COST OF FARM WELFARE 58 (1989).
Farm prices soared from $7 billion in 1970 to $43.8 billion in 1981. George J. Church, Real
Trouble on the Farm, TIME, Feb. 18, 1985, at 24, 28.
89. Relaxed standards on Federal Land Bank lending and an increase in loans by other
lending institutions also contributed to the increased land values. Jason Manning, The Midwest
Farm Crisis of the 1980s, http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id395.htm.
90. JAMES SCHWAB, THE FARM CREDIT CRISIS IN IOWA (1985).
91. LUTrRELL, supra note 88, at 82.
92. MARK FRIEDBERGER, SHAKE OUT: IOWA FARM FAMILIES IN THE 1980s, at 30 (1989).
93. Id. at 45.
94. Id
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from 1970 to 1980.95 Neither the farmers nor the lenders concerned
themselves about the mounting debt, expecting the proceeds from the
export sales, coupled with the rising property values, to enable the
farmers to make timely payments. 96
However, the agricultural boon of the 1970s would not continue
into the next decade. By 1980, the indebted farmer faced excessively
high interest rates 97 and "tight money."9 8  The high interest rates
translated into higher payments for the farmer, who received a variable
interest rate. Further, the restrictions on lending made it difficult for the
farmers to borrow additional money to cover the higher payments. This
one-two punch burst the agriculture bubble.99 By 1984, overproduction
and increased forei competition caused farm commodities prices to
drop significantly. When it seemed like things could not get any
worse, it did, farm-operatin costs, such as fuel and fertilizer, jumped
due to a spike in oil prices.
As a result of these rather unfortunate events, farm income
dropped, to be followed by land values. Those farmers who borrowed
heavily in the 1970s, found themselves unable to make their loan
payments as their incomes decreased due to a decrease in farm prices.
The option to sell off part of their land to pay off their loans was not
available either, since the land values decreased to an amount less than
their outstanding debt.102 It was not long before lenders began
foreclosure proceedings against the delinquent farmers.
Responding to the crisis the American farmers faced, Congress
passed legislation to create federal farming programslo3 designed to aid
95. NEIL E. HARL, THE FARM DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980s, at 28 (1990).
96. The value of farm real estate rose an average of 8.1% per year, between 1940 and 1982.
LUTTRELL, supra note 88.
97. The interest rates were as high as 21.5%. Stewart E. Bland, Insolvencies in Farming and
Agribusiness, 73 KY. L.J. 795, 796 (1984).
98. The Federal Reserve Board made an effort to end inflation by reducing the credit supply.
HARL, supra note 95, at 14-15.
99. Manning, supra note 89.
100. "American farm products were still costlier than those of competitors on the international
market; federal price supports kept prices artificially high enough so that farmers in Argentina,
Australia, Canada, and Europe were able to seize more of the market than ever before." Id. See
also Heather Ball & Leland Beatty, Blowing Away the Family Farmer: The Debt Tornado, THE
NATION, Nov. 3, 1984, at 442-44.
101. Bland, supra note 97, at 796.
102. David Harrington & Thomas A. Carlin, The U.S. Farm Sector: How Is It Weathering the
1980's?, Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin No.
506, 12-17, available at http://tiny.cc/8dn7s.
103. The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) was one of the main agricultural lenders
participating in the program.
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the farmers to avoid foreclosure and continue their farming operations.
The federal programs were generally an agreement between the Federal
government and the farm lending institution. If the lender agreed to
reduce a part of the farmer's indebtedness, the federal government
would guarantee a portion of the farmer's remaining balance.
While the farm programs would most likely help the farmer save
his agricultural business, under the current income tax laws, the indebted
solvent farmer, eligible to participate in the program, would have
discharge of indebtedness income. Because of the Bankruptcy Tax Act
of 1980 and section 108(e)(1), the solvent farmer would not be able to
find protection under section 108 or the judicially-created exceptions.
Concerned that the potential tax consequences would prevent
otherwise eligible farmers from participating in the Federal farm
programs, thus resulting in the forfeiture of their land, Congress included
a provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86"1),5 specifically
intended to address the dilemma solvent farmers faced. o0 TRA 86
provided, in part, that "certain solvent [farmers] realizing income from
the discharge of certain farming-related indebtedness may reduce tax
attributes, including basis in property, under rules similar to those
applicable to insolvent taxpayers." 1 The special provision for
discharges of "certain farm indebtedness" in TRA 86, became section
108(a)(1)(C) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, and provided that gross
income shall not include discharge of indebtedness if "the indebtedness
discharged is qualified farm indebtedness ("QFI")."',08
A. Definition of QFI
Section 108(g), as enacted in 1986, provided that discharged
indebtedness would be considered QFI if: (1) the indebtedness was
104. General Explanations, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1986).
105. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
106. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 109TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM
OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 220 (Comm. Print 2006) ("Congress was
concerned that pending legislation providing Federal guarantees for lenders participating in farm-
loan write-downs would cause some farmers to recognize large amounts of income when farm loans
were canceled. As a result, these farmers might be forced to sell their farmland to pay the taxes on
the canceled debt. This tax provision was adopted to mitigate that problem.").
107. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 405(a), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
108. Id. TRA 86 also repealed the "qualified business indebtedness" exclusion originally under
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C), replacing it with "qualified farm indebtedness." Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 822,
9A U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat) 289 (1986) (repealing I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C)). "Congress believed that
the prior law treatment of discharge of qualified business indebtedness was too generous.. . . [and]
produced disparate results among taxpayers depending upon the makeup of their depreciable
assets." Id.
2011] 87
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discharged by a "qualified person,"l09 defined under I.R.C. §
46(c)(8)(D)(iv) of the Internal Revenue Code;"o (2) the "indebtedness
was incurred directly in connection with the operation by the taxpayer of
the trade or business of farming"I' and; (3) at least 50% of the
taxpayer's average annual "gross receipts" for the three years prior to
the year in which the discharge of such indebtedness occurs, is
attributable to the trade or business of farming.112 Upon meeting all
three requirements under section 108(g), the farmer is required to reduce
his tax attributes and the basis in his properties to the extent of the
amount of the discharged debt.11 3 Not surprisingly, the qualified farm
indebtedness exception had its critics. Those criticizing the QFI
exception, among other things, found some of the requirements
restricting, some of the terms ambiguous or limiting, or the overall effect
of the provision contrary to legislative intent.
B. Criticisms of the Section 108(a)(1)(C): Tax Attribute Limitation
Contrary to Legislative Intent
One criticism of newly enacted section 108(a)(1)(C) was that it
only excluded discharge of indebtedness income to the extent of the
taxpayer's "tax attributes and properties" bases. In other words, a
farmer's discharged indebtedness could qualify as QFI, but to the extent
that the discharged amount exceeded his tax attributes and bases in his
properties, he had gross income. Such limitation was deemed "contrary
to the congressional intent of the 1986 act."1 14
As noted by one critic, when section 108(a)(1)(C) was enacted, so
long as the farmer met all three requirements under section 108(g), he
could exclude the debt discharged from gross income, even where the
amount discharged exceeded the tax attributes and bases.1 5  The
Conference Committee Report published in conjunction with TRA 86
supported this finding.116 Ignoring the legislative history, the Staff of the
109. I.R.C. § 108(g)(1) (1986).
110. Id. § 108(g)(3).
111. Id. § 108(g)(2)(A).
112. Id § 108(g)(2)(B).
113. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(4), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2224.
114. The Utility Ratepayer Refund Act of 1989, 135 CONG. REC. 3033 (1989) (statement of
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan).
115. Stephan Garelis, Problems Remain in Handling Discharge of Farm Debt by Solvent
Farmers, 67 J. TAX'N 230 (1987). "As enacted, Section 108(g), on its face, is limited only by the
amount of qualified farm debt cancelled." Id.
116. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-841, at 116 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4203-
04). The Utility Ratepayer Refund Act of 1989, supra note 114. See also Extension of Remarks,
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Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 ("Blue Book")" 7 and the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMIRA")1 8 concluded that "[t]o the extent
there is unabsorbed discharge of indebtedness income after the reduction
of tax attributes and the basis of qualified property, the taxpayer will
recognize income."1 19
C Insolvent Farmers Excluded
An additional, albeit easily fixable, issue with section 108(g)
concerned the disparate treatment of insolvent farmers. Section 108(g),
as enacted, was limited to farmers who were solvent at the time of the
discharge. Insolvent farmers were not eligible for the exclusion and
could, theoretically, have discharge of indebtedness income.120 For
example, Farmer A has $1,000 of QFI and $2,000 in assets. Farmer A's
creditor discharges $700 of QFI. Farmer A remains solvent after the
discharge, to the extent of $1,700 and may exclude the $700 of
discharged debt (assuming his tax attributes equaled or exceeded
$700). On the other hand, Farmer B has $1,000 QFI and $500 in
assets. Farmer B's creditor discharges $600 of QFI. If Farmer B's tax
attributes equal $500, then his QFI may be excluded to that extent. The
remaining $100 of discharged QFI is gross income because Farmer B is
insolvent, to that extent and section 108(a)(1)(C) does not apply to
insolvent farmers. 122
This contrary result did not last long, as it was resolved in the
Technical Corrections Bill with an ordering rule, providing that the
insolvency exception applies first, and that the section 108(g) applies
Proceedings and Debates of the 101st Congress, First Session Material in Extension of Remarks
was not spoken by a Member on the floor, 135 CONG. REC. E2887-03, E2888 (1989) (statement of
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, North Dakota) ("It is my understanding that a controversy has arisen
concerning the solvent farmer provision due to the passage of the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 [TAMRA]. Within TAMRA, a technical correction limited the tax-free
discharge of indebtedness under the solvent farmer provision to the amount the basis and the tax
attributes remaining in the farm property. Any write-down in excess of that amount is treated as
income . .. [T]his so-called technical correction runs contrary to the congressional intent of the
1986 act.").
117. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 100 Stat. 2085 (1987).
118. Section 1004(a)(4) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA).
Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3385 (1988).
119. Id. § 1004(a)(5) (amending I.R.C. § 1017(b)(4) (1986)).
120. See Garelis, supra note 115.
121. See id. for a similar example.
122. See id. for a similar example.
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once the farmer becomes solvent.123 So in the above example, Farmer
B's debt discharge of $600 would be excluded entirely-$500 would be
excluded under the insolvency exception (because Farmer B's liabilities
exceed his assets by $500), and the remaining $100 will be excluded
under the QFI exception.
D. "Trade or Business ofFanning"
Section 108(g) only applies in the case of indebtedness incurred in
connection with the operation by the taxpayer of the trade or business of
farming, by a qualified unrelated party. Congress failed either expressly
or by reference, to define the term "trade or business of farming." As
one critic noted:
Congress' failure to define the phrase "trade or business of farming"
for purposes of the QFI exception either expressly or by reference,
sowed fertile seeds for litigation. Taxpayers are likely to raise creative
arguments to establish their debt as incurred in connection with their
operation of a trade or business of farming, thereby satisfying the first
element of the QFI exception12 4
Surprisingly, the reasonable prediction did not come true; however,
subsequent cases, Internal Revenue Service rulings, and Treasury
regulations would embrace a broad definition.125
E. Gross Receipts Test
Critics found the gross receipts test to be very limiting, only
providing tax relief to those farmers "who derive at least 50 percent of
their average annual gross receipts for the proceeding 3 years from
farming."' 2  It "precluded relief for farmers ... forced to sell assets to
satisfy farm debts, denied crop financing, or are otherwise forced to
scale down their farm operations."l27 A proposal by a United States
Representative was made to redefine gross receipts to income
attributable to both, the trade or business of farming or the sale or lease
of assets used in such trade or business, so that a farmer who "cash
123. Id.
124. Dirk A. Williams, The Qualified Farm Indebtedness Exception to Taxation ofDischarged
Debt: Making Hay Under TRA, 50 MONT. L. REV. 279, 287 (1989). For a further discussion of the
various definitions of "trade or business of farming" provided in the Code, see id.
125. See IRS FSA, 1993 WL 1469706; Treas. Reg. §1.61-4(d) (2010) states: "The term 'farm'
embraces the farm in the ordinarily accepted sense, and includes . poultry ... farms."
126. The Utility Ratepayer Refund Act of 1989, supra note 114.
127. Id.
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rents" his land during that three-year period would be able to meet the
gross receipts test.12 8 Congress failed to accept the proposed legislation.
The concern expressed by the representative became an actual issue a
few years later, in Lawinger v. Commissioner.129
In Lawinger, the taxpayer operated a beef farm until 1986, when
she sold the cattle and farm equipment and rented the land to another
farmer. In 1989, the taxpayer restructured her $242,453 debt with
FmHA, which discharged $199,701 of the debt and gave the taxpayer a
new note reflecting the non-discharged debt of $42,752. The discharged
debt resulted in the taxpayer becoming solvent. The taxpayer treated the
$199,701 of discharged debt as QFI and excluded it from gross income,
pursuant to section 108(a)(1)(C). The Internal Revenue Service
determined that none of the discharged debt qualified as QFI because the
taxpayer failed the gross receipts test. 130
Both parties agreed that the taxpayer's aggregate gross receipts for
the three years prior to the year of debt discharge (1986 through 1988)
totaled $165,383, requiring at least $82,691.50 of that amount to be
attributable to the trade or business of farming. The taxpayer contended
that her aggregate gross receipts attributable to her farming business
totaled $87,753. She included:
1986: Gross income from farming $29,319
1986: Sales price from sale of livestock $12,868
1987: Farm rental income $ 8,000
1987: Proceeds from the sale of farm machinery $37,566
Total gross receipts attributable to farming: $87,753.131
The government asserted that the taxpayer's farm rental income and
the sale of the farm equipment were not attributable to the trade or
business of farming, thus, total gross receipts attributable to the trade or
business of farming was $42,187 ($12,868 from sale of livestock and
$29,319 from 1986 farm income), therefore, it determined that the
taxpayer did not satisfy the aggregate gross receipts test of section
108(g)(2)(B).1 3 2
While finding that the sale of the farm equipment was attributable
to the trade or business of farming, 133 the court held that the gross rental
128. Id.
129. 103 T.C. 428,429 (1994).
130. Id. at 431-32.
131. Id. at 433.
132. Id. at 434.
133. Id. at 437.
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income in 1987 is "not attributable to petitioner's trade or business of
farming because the amounts of the rent collected were not dependent
upon farm production, and if any trade or business of farming occurred,
it was carried on by the lessee, not by petitioner."134 Thus, only $79,753
of the taxpayer's aggregate gross receipts were attributable to farming-
less than $3,000 shy of the 50% mark. The court found the taxpayer's
situation to be a "sympathetic yet difficult case," 135 for, had petitioner
restructured her debt a year earlier, she would have met the gross
receipts test.1 36
V. ECONoMiC CRISIS: HOUSING/MORTGAGE CRISIS.
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: SECTION 108(A)(1)(E)
A. Collapse of the Housing Market
Some argue that the root cause of today's housing crisis was federal
legislation enacted to provide everyone the opportunity to own a
home.137  However, there is no argument that the Federal Reserve's
decision to lower interest rates-and to keep them low for six years-
and the lending industry's relaxed lending practices with respect to high-
risk homeowners, significantly contributed to the collapse of the housing
market in 2006 (or 2007).138
In 2001, the Federal Reserve Board lowered interest rates in an
effort to boost the economy, which had declined due to the 2000
recession, and later the September 11 terrorist attacks. The interest rates,
which were at 6% at the beginning of 2001, were lowered to 1.75% by
the end of the year.139  For the housing market, the low interest rates
134. Id.
135. Id. at 436.
136. Id.
137. The idea can be traced to the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), a program enacted
during the Carter Administration that urged lenders to approve loans to borrowers traditionally
found unqualified. Banks that did not ease credit restrictions risked being fined or penalized, under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") or Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). See
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 26 (2009). "National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in an American
Dream," was another program touting homeownership "as both patriotic and an easy win for all,"
created under the Clinton administration. See id at 26. See also Yaron Brook, The Government
Did It, FORBES.COM (July 18, 2008, 11:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/18/fannie-freddie-
regulation-oped-cxyb_0718brook.html.
138. Moran, supra note 137, at 14.
139. Entering 2001, the country was entering a recession, caused by a decline in the stock
market the previous year and the fall of the dot-com industry. To prevent deflation and to cushion
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translated into lower monthly payments for those taking out mortgage
loans. Lower monthly mortgage payments allowed more people to
purchase homes, which in turn, increased demand.140 As housing
demand increased, so did home prices, increasing by 5.7% each year
between 2000 and 2006.141
Lenders enjoyed the robust real estate market and wanted it to
continue and grow. As such, lenders sought out a new group of
perspective homebuyers to enter the housing market-subprime
borrowers.142 By 2003, subprime lending, virtually unheard of in 1994
and used primaril by the heavily regulated banking industry, had
increased ten-fold. However, it was independent mortgage firms and
other non-banking industries-which were not regulated-that provided
most of the subprime loans. The unregulated subprime lenders, with
their lax lending standards, "crafted creative loans to provide money to
the high-risk borrowers [which allowed them] to purchase more
expensive homes."144 Rather than considering the borrower's credit
history, down payment contribution, or future income as qualifiers for
the collapse of the dot-com bubble, the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates to historic lows,
hoping to spur the economy. Id. at 13-14.
140. "Homeownership rose to 67.4% ... in 2000 from 64% in 1994, and peaked in 2004, with
an all-time high of about 69%." Id. at 19 (internal citation omitted).
141. Manav Tanneeru, How a 'Perfect Storm' Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2010). See also The Housing Decline: The Extent of the Problem and Potential Remedies:
Hearing Before the S Comm. on Finance, 1l0th Cong. 1 (2007) (testimony of Morris A. Davis,
Assistant Professor in Real Estate and Urban Land Economics, School of Business, University of
Wisconsin-Madison). Prior to 1997, housing prices increased by about 0.6% per year. Id "Since
2006, real house prices have been flat." Id.
142. Subprime borrowers generally did not qualify for mortgage loans for a number of reasons,
including poor credit histories, inadequate incomes, and high debt-to-equity ratios. However, in
1994, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary, Henry Cisneros, eased mortgage
restrictions to allow subprime borrowers to qualify for mortgage loans. Still, the subprime borrower
remained a credit risk, thus, lenders charged them a higher interest rate than their credit-worthy
prime borrowers. While the higher interest rate meant that the subprime borrower's monthly
mortgage payments would be higher than the prime borrower who borrowed the same amount, it did
not discourage the subprime borrower from seeking a mortgage or loan. See Moran, supra note
137, at 20, 25-26. Among other things, HUD modified existing regulations and allowed borrowers
to qualify for a mortgage loan without proof of an income history or a steady source of future
income; eliminated the requirement that lenders use third-party appraisers, allowing instead for the
lenders to handpick them; and allowed lenders to approve borrowers based on their application
alone, no longer requiring them to interview the borrowers in person. Subprime lending was used
frequently by the banking industry, during the 1990s. While profitable, it was not considered risky,
because the banking industry was subject to strict regulations. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 29. "Subprime mortgage origination volume increased for less than five percent, or
$35 billion, of total mortgage origination volume in 1994 to nearly twenty percent, or $625 billion,
in 2005." Id. at 23.
144. Id at 16.
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the loan, subprime lenders based the loan approval on an expectation
that the already increasing home values would continue to increase. 145
This irresponsible lending practice allowed otherwise unqualified
borrowers to enter the housing market, thereby increasing demand and
further increasing home values.
The most common type of loan offered to subprime borrowers was
the adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM"). The ARM was attractive
because it offered very low interest rates to the subprime borrower for
the first two or three years. However, at the end of the period, the
interest rate would reset to a much higher rate, sometimes doubling the
monthly mortgage payments.146 Take, for example, a subprime
customer who received a $200,000 ARM at an interest of 2% for the first
three years increasing to 12% thereafter. His monthly payment for years
1 through 3 would be $1030. 147 However, in year 4 and subsequent
years, when the interest rate jumped to 12%, the mortgage payment
jumps to $2348.89.148 An amount he would most likely not be able to
pay.
However, both the homeowner and the subprime lender did not
concern themselves with year 4, the date the interest rate would reset.
Both believed the home's value would have increased by that time,
allowing the homeowner to borrow from the equity in the home to make
the higher payments. Or, they believed that interest rates would remain
low and refinancing for a low, fixed-interest rate would be available
three years later. Such assumptions were very wrong and very costly.
By 2006, job losses and rising interest rates led to depreciating
home values. These three factors caused the housing bubble to burst and
affected the homeowner's ability to keep his home. Homeowners who
lost their jobs could not make their current mortgage payments, and they
lost their homes through bank foreclosures. Homeowners who were
employed, but whose low-interest "teaser" rates increased, could not
afford the higher monthly mortgage payments. They defaulted on their
loans, and the lenders foreclosed on the homes.
By the end of 2006, nearly 1.2 million homes were in
foreclosure.149 The number of foreclosures continued to rise each year,
145. Id. at 22.
146. Id.
147. See Mortgage Calculator, WWW.BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/mortgage-calculator.aspx (last visited Oct. 30,
2010). The monthly payment also includes property taxes of 1.5%.
148. See id.
149. See http://www.realtytrac.com (2005 foreclosure numbers were 547,000 and increased by
45% in 2006).
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with 2,824,674 foreclosures in 2009.150 The significant amount of
foreclosures resulted in an oversupply of homes. The large inventory of
homes caused home values to plummet. Homes were now worth less
than the outstanding loan balance. The sinking values barred any
chances of homeowners with ARMs to refinance their loan at a lower
interest rate.
B. Foreclosures, Debt Discharges and MDRA 2007
In the case of foreclosures, with home values at rock bottom, sales
proceeds received from the foreclosure sale did not cover the
outstanding loan balance. If the loan was recourse, the lender had the
option to go after the homeowner personally to collect the balance.15
However, where the homeowner had no assets-which was usually the
case-the lender chose to discharge the debt, viewing as imprudent the
decision to sue the former homeowner. Upon discharge of the debt, if
the homeowner was not insolvent, he had gross income under section
61(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code.152
When Congress passed the MDRA to add section 108(a)(1)(E) to
the Internal Revenue Code, it intended to help both the foreclosed
homeowner-in particular the subprime borrower. For the foreclosed
homeowner, the MDRA would prevent the "double whammy" that
would have otherwise occurred: the loss of the home through
foreclosure followed by an income tax upon discharge of the mortgage
indebtedness. The following hypothetical illustrates the tax burden
foreclosed homeowners faced upon discharge of their mortgage
indebtedness, and the tax relief section 108(a)(1)(E) is designed to offer
them.
Married homeowners Henry and Gina borrowed $140,000 from
Bank XYZ to purchase a home. Two years after purchasing their home,
Henry lost his job. Gina made the $1000 monthly mortgage payment
until the interest rate on their loan skyrocketed to 12.5%, increasing the
payment to $1500 a month. Gina could not make the increased
mortgage payments, and Henry and Gina eventually found themselves
more than four months behind. As a consequence of nonpayment, Bank
XYZ foreclosed on the couple's home. The foreclosure sale brought in
only $40,000. There still remained a balance (deficiency) of $95,000
150. See id. The projected number of foreclosures in 2010 does not look too promising.
151. Compare recourse mortgage with a non-recourse mortgage, which means that the lender's
only recourse is the mortgaged property.
152. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2006).
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owed to the bank. However, because Henry and Gina lost their only
asset, Bank XYZ made the business decision to discharge the deficiency
balance. Bank XYZ's discharge of Henry and Gina's mortgage liability
triggered "discharge of indebtedness income," to them equal to the
$95,000 of the cancelled debt.
Prior to the Mortgage Debt Relief Act, the $95,000 of discharged
indebtedness would have subjected Henry and Gina to federal income
tax based on the discharged amount. 153 So the devastation Henry and
Gina felt after losing their home to foreclosure would be exacerbated
upon learning of the income tax liability on the phantom income,
resulting from the discharged debt. Congressional response to such
unexpected tax consequences, through the enactment of the Mortgage
Debt Relief Act, attempts to protect homeowners in situations similar to
Henry and Gina, allowing them to rebuild their financial futures without
the added burden of an income tax that, in most cases, they would be
unable to pay.
Section 108(a)(1)(E) excludes from gross income discharges of
"qualified principal residence indebtedness." On the surface, the
provision seems to do that which Congress intended, provide tax relief to
the foreclosed homeowner whose debt was discharged. However, the
actual effect of section 108(a)(1)(E) does not fully reflect Congress's
intentions and/or concerns for the distressed homeowner. 154 A closer
examination of section 108(a)(1)(E) reveals that, in spite of its
deceptively simple requirements, not all foreclosed homeowners will
benefit from the tax relief provision. The reasons include the
provision's: (1) short deadline; (2) narrow definition of qualified
principal residence indebtedness ("QPRI"); and (3) disparate treatment
of similarly situated homeowners.
153. See id. It provides that gross income includes discharge of indebtedness, "Where a
recourse mortgage has been discharged, cancellation of indebtedness income arises to the extent the
amount of the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property." Johnson v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2005, at *2 (1999); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c), Example (8); Gehl v. Comm'r, 102
T.C. 784, 786 (1994), aff'd by, No. 94-3111, 1995 WL 115589 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995); Bialock v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C. 649,660 (1961).
154. "[I]f you are unfortunate enough to lose your home to foreclosure because you are
struggling, you have suffered enough. You shouldn't be punished further by being taxed on what
you no longer own." 153 CONG. REc. H 11, 256 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Dennis
Cardoza).
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C. Temporary Deadline
The tax relief available to homeowners under section 108(a)(1)(E)
is temporary, available until December 31, 2012.155 Solvent taxpayers
whose mortgage debts are discharged after December 31, 2012, will
have discharge of indebtedness income. Given the concern that
Congress expressed for foreclosed homeowners, it is puzzling as to why
it made the provision not only temporary, but available for such a short
period.
D. Should It Be Permanent?
History shows that foreclosures resulting from economic downturns
are not new, as they have been occurring since the Great Depression. In
1932, approximately 250,000 homes were foreclosed.' 5 6 By 1933, more
than 1,000 homes were being foreclosed each day.157 One could say that
Congress was a little late to the party when they passed the MDRA in
2007; as such, legislation was warranted eighty years ago.
Originally, the insolvency exception under section 22(b)(9) of the
1939 Code was to last for only a short period of time. 15 Qualified farm
indebtedness was also intended to be temporary. Both provisions are
now permanent. The legislative history does not specify what Congress
considered when they made both provisions permanent. However, such
a decision makes sense considering the purpose of section 108-to
minimize hardship-and the cyclical nature of a down-turned economy.
In contrast, when Congress enacted tax relief for canceled debt with
respect to Hurricane Katrina victims, such relief was temporary.
Hurricanes, while common, do not occur in the same areas or on a
regular basis. Nor do they cause the kind of devastation that Hurricane
Katrina caused. Thus, the temporary relief is justified.
155. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765,
Div. A. § 303, extended the exclusion's sunset date from January 1, 2010 to January 1, 2013.
156. See Fred Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great Depression, 57
ALA. L. REv. 231, 240 (2005).
157. Id. at 239.
158. Originally, when Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1939 to offer tax relief to
corporations in an unsound financial condition, such businesses could redeem its indebtedness for
less than face value without recognizing income if such cancellation occurred between January 1,
1939 and January 1, 1943. See H.R. REP. NO. 76-855, at 23 (1939). The exclusion for corporations
was extended an additional three years in the Revenue Act of 1942. S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 77-78
(1942). In the Revenue Act of 1951, Congress made the temporary provision permanent. See H.R.
REP. 82-311 (1951).
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Permanently excluding qualified principal mortgage indebtedness
from gross income would fall in line with the many other tax incentives
offered to homeowners as a means of encouraging home ownership.
These tax benefits include: (1) Internal Revenue Code section 121,
which excludes from gross income gains (profits) of up to $500,000
from the sale of a principal residence;159 (2) Internal Revenue Code
section 164, which allows a deduction for real estate taxes paid on
mortgage loans; (3) Internal Revenue Code section 163, which entitles a
homeowner to a deduction for the interest paid on their mortgage
loan. 160
A permanent exclusion for discharge of mortgage indebtedness
would also have the effect of encouraging home ownership because it
would allay the fear that may prevent people from making home
purchases-the fear of foreclosure. While a permanent exclusion for the
discharge of qualified principal residence indebtedness does not prevent
foreclosure, it can provide a sense of comfort to prospective
homeowners to know that in the event of their worst fear-foreclosure-
they will not be subject to an income tax on the phantom income.
E. Extension of Temporary Deadline
Even if the temporary deadline can be justified for policy
reasons,161 there are a number of arguments to support extending it.
159. I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b). The gain excluded is a maximum of $250,000 for single filers and
married couples filing separate returns. The maximum of $500,000 excluded applies to married
taxpayers who file joint returns. Id.
160. However, some proponents of the temporary exclusion use the three housing deductions
mentioned as reasons for the mortgage debt relief exclusion to be temporary. See PAMELA J.
JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34212, ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED TAX ExCLUSION FOR
CANCELED MORTGAGE DEBT INCOME 10 (2007).
The deduction for mortgage interest is the most costly provision, with an estimate of
$79.9 billion in revenue loss for FY2008. The exclusion of gain on the sales of homes is
the second largest tax provision for homeowners, with an estimate of $29 billion in tax
revenue loss for FY2008. The deduction of state and local real estate taxes is the third
provision, with an estimate of $14.3 billion in tax revenue loss for FY2008.
Id. at 10-11 (internal citations omitted).
161. As one witness stated during a Senate Hearing concerning the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt
Relief Act,
I believe that H.R. 3648 should be made temporary. The current market conditions are
unusual. Because most home value losses today are more likely due to these market
conditions rather than due to personal consumption, it might be administrable "rough
justice" to allow all such debt-discharge income to be excluded, without a specific
showing that the home's loss in value was due solely to market conditions rather than
personal consumption. But that will not be true forever, the home market will eventually
revert to the historical norm where most well-maintained homes at least maintain their
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First, the housing market crisis has not bottomed out. Foreclosures
continue to be on the rise as people continue to lose their jobs. 162it
defeats the purpose of the mortgage indebtedness exclusion to have this
impending deadline, when there have been no signs of an end to the
housing market crisis-or even signs of an improving housing
market. 1 63 The fact that the original deadline of December 31, 2010 was
extended to December 31, 2012, indicates that the crisis will exist for a
longer time than Congress originally believed.
Secondly, many homeowners who will lose their homes to
foreclosure before January 1, 2013 will not be able to benefit from
section 108(a)(1)(E), if the banks do not or cannot sell the homes before
the deadline. This will likely be the case because banks are finding it
difficult to dispose of their current inventory of homes.164 A
homeowner cannot incur discharge of indebtedness income until such
indebtedness has been discharged. The banks cannot discharge the
mortgage debt until they sell the homes. If banks do not sell the homes
until after the deadline, then it follows that any discharge of
indebtedness income will be past the deadline. Thus, under this
scenario, homeowners forced out of their homes before the December
31, 2012, will not be able to exclude any discharge of indebtedness from
gross income. To avoid this harsh result, the temporary deadline should
be based on the date of the foreclosure and not the date of discharge.165
nominal value (if not actually appreciate over time). When that happens, most value
loss, if it occurs, will be due to personal consumption, and thus, any resulting realized
debt-discharge income should be includable by the solvent taxpayer.
The Housing Decline: The Extent of the Problem and Potential Remedies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, I10th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of Deborah A. Geier, Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law, Cleveland State Univ.), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/121307testdg.pdf.
162. Already, January's 315,716 foreclosures are 15% higher than in 2009 and February's
308,524 foreclosures are 6% higher than the previous year. www.realtytrac.com. See also Carolyn
Kemp, Delinquencies, Foreclosures Starts Fall in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey,
MORTGAGEBANKERS.COM (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedial
PressCenter/71891.htm. ("Foreclosure rates could continue to climb, however, based on the ability
of borrowers 90 days or more delinquent to solve their problems.").
163. "It is too early to determine when the housing slump will end." JOINT CTR FOR Hous.
STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV. THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 4 (2007), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf "Recent studies have
projected that the slump will continue, with no foreseeable relief for troubled homeowners." Rachel
Carlton, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt ReliefAct of2007,45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 601, 601 (2008).
164. In 2007, 4.5 million existing homes for sale, a 10.8 month supply compared to 3.9 million
or 7.4 months supply in 2006. In 2004, it was 2.2 million or 4.3 months. See National Association
of Realtors.
165. From the time the bank forecloses on the home to the time it is sold takes approximately
eighteen months. Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart
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F. Definition of "Qualified Principal Residence Indebtedness"
Only "qualified principal residence indebtedness ("QPRI")" will be
excluded from discharge of indebtedness income. Section 108(h)(3)
defines qualified principal residence indebtedness as: acquisition
indebtedness ("Al"). The section then references section 163(h)(3)(B) to
provide the definition for acquisition indebtedness, which it defines as
indebtedness incurred in the acquisition, construction or substantial
improvement of a qualified residence and is secured by the residence. 166
Stated simply, qualified principal residence indebtedness is indebtedness
incurred in the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a
qualified residence.
The problem in using section 163(h)(3)(B) to define QPRI is that
section 163(h)(3)(B) is a deduction-granting provision. Provisions
allowing income tax deductions are narrowly construed. 167 It generally
follows that any definition associated with a tax deduction will be
narrow in scope. Using the tax-deduction provision to define QPRI will
exclude certain types of mortgage indebtedness.
Two types of mortgage indebtedness that may fail to meet the
definition of QPRI are home equity lines of credit ("HELOCs") and
second mortgages. A homeowner, who takes out either of these types of
loans, generally does not use the borrowed funds to acquire or construct
a home. While he may use the funds to improve his residence
substantially, he may also use the money to purchase a car, pay off credit
card debt, or go on vacation. In such instances, the indebtedness, which
is secured by his residence, does not qualify as QPRI. As such, any
discharge of the liability will cause the homeowner to recognize
discharge of indebtedness income. A result that seems contrary to the
legislative intent because the homeowner who defaults on this type of
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 16 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/fmwp_0403servicing.pdf.
166. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B) (2010). Refinancing of the indebtedness is also included in the
definition of acquisition indebtedness. Id.
167. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (noting the familiar rule that
deductions are to be strictly and narrowly construed, allowed only "as there is a clear provision
therefore"); In re Harvard Indus. v. IRS, 568 F.3d 444, 454 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[T]he taxpayer has the
burden of proving its eligibility for a deduction, and statutes authorizing deductions are a matter of
legislative grace and are to be construed narrowly, unless the text of the statute authorizing the
deduction reflects a different congressional intent."); Consol. Chollar Gould & Savage Min. Co. v.
Comn'r, 133 F.2d 440, 441 (9th Cir. 1943) (holding that "the ambiguity arising from two possible
rational interpretations must be resolved against the taxpayer seeking the deduction and which must
bring itself clearly within the area of legislative grace." (emphasis added)).
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loan still faces foreclosure, and will be further burdened with an income
tax.
What makes the narrow definition of QPRI even more perplexing is
that homeowners are allowed a mortgage interest deduction with respect
to this type of indebtedness, which the Tax Code calls "home equity
indebtedness."l68 This turns into an absurd result, in that the definition
of QPRI for a tax provision designed to provide tax relief is narrower
than the tax provision designed solely "as a matter of legislative
,,169grace.
In contrast, when Congress amended section 108 to offer tax relief
to farmers discharged of "qualified farm indebtedness ("QFI")," the term
"farm" (or farming), was not given a restrictive definition. In fact,
Congress did not define "farm," or any of its derivatives (which invited
litigation). Instead, the definition was developed through case law and
resulted in "farm" being broadly defined.170
It is noteworthy that the courts could have, but did not adopt the
more restrictive definition of farming found under the tax deduction
provision of section 464(e). Section 464(e) limits farming to "the
cultivation of land or the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or
horticultural commodity including the raisin , shearing, feeding, caring
for, training, and management of animals." Such a limited definition
would have prevented many farmers from qualifying for the tax relief
offered under section 108(a)(1)(C).172
168. I.R.C. §163(h)(3)(C)(i) (."[H]ome equity indebtedness' means any indebtedness (other
than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified residence. . . .").
169. At least one scholar agrees with limiting the exclusion to indebtedness used substantially
to improve the home, ". . . as such debt is tantamount to credit card debt that just happens to be
secured by the home. If such debt is cancelled, the justification for exclusion . . . disappears." The
Housing Decline: The Extent of the Problem and Potential Remedies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (testimony of Deborah A. Geier, Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law, Cleveland State Univ.).
170. Poultry farms are considered farms for purposes of QFI. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(d); "[T]he
operation of an integrated poultry processing business meets the definition of farm for QFI
purposes." Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 438, 447 (1975). Further, the term
"farmers" includes not just individuals, but any partnership or corporation that "cultivates, operates,
or manages a farm for gain or profit, either as owner or tenant." Treas. Reg. § 1.175-3 (2010). The
broad definition "is in keeping with the purpose of the statute: assisting farmers to keep and
continue operating their farms and to avoid bankruptcy." 135 CONG. REC. S5078-02 (daily ed. May
10, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
171. I.R.C. § 464(e) (1997).
172. For a more detailed discussion of the definition of "farms," see Williams, supra note 124.
201l] 101
33
Armstrong: From the Great Depression to the Current Housing Crisis: What Cod
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
G. "Substantial Improvement of the Qualified Residence"
If the homeowner uses the borrowed funds to substantially improve
his personal residence (and the loan is secured by the residence), it is
QPRI. However, determining what constitutes a substantial
improvement to make the indebtedness QPRI may not be so easy. Will
using the funds to paint the exterior and interior of the home be
considered a substantial improvement? What about buying furniture for
the home, putting in a new air conditioning, or heating unit? Consider
the following scenario.
In 2002, homeowner purchased a principal residence for $150,000,
taking out a $150,000 mortgage loan with no down payment. The loan
was secured by the principal residence. In 2003, when the home was
valued at $200,000, homeowner took out a second mortgage in the
amount of $50,000 that she used to add a garage to her home ($35,000)
and to make improvements to the landscaping ($15,000). The total
amount borrowed was $200,000. In 2008, the homeowner could no
longer make her mortgage payments. The bank foreclosed. After the
sale of the home, the bank discharged the remaining balance of $50,000.
The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that $35,000 is
QPRI, but $15,000 is not because it was not used to "acquire, construct,
or substantially improve the property."17 3 However, the taxpayer could
reasonably take the opposite position and consider the entire $50,000
QPRI, believing that all expenses incurred substantially improved her
home. These opposite positions will naturally lead to costly litigation,
for both the government and the taxpayer.
So long as the home served as security for the loan, thereby giving
the bank the right to foreclose on the property upon default, this should
be sufficient for the indebtedness to qualify as QPRI. QPRI should not
be restricted by what the homeowner does with the funds. Otherwise, it
does exactly what the legislation seeks to prevent: taxation on the
foreclosed homeowners. Surely, offering an exclusion to help the
homeowners, but making it difficult for many of them to meet the
requirements was not Congress's intentions.
173. Id.
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H. Disparate Treatment of Homeowners with HEI that is not QPRI
"Tax policy does not favor dissimilar taxation of similarly situated
taxpayers." 74  Not allowing home equity indebtedness to qualify as
QPRI will result in discharge of indebtedness income for those
homeowners if the debt is "recourse," 175 while homeowners discharged
of home equity "nonrecourse" 17 6 indebtedness will legally be able to
avoid a tax. Consider the following scenarios.
In 2003, Mr. and Mrs. Smith purchased a residence for $200,000.
They used $20,000 of their own funds and borrowing the remaining
$180,000 from State Bank. Mr. and Mrs. Smith were personally liable
for the loan, i.e., it was a recourse loan. In 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Smith
took out a second mortgage in the amount of $30,000. They used the
loan proceeds to pay off their student loans. In 2008, financial problems
prevented Mr. and Mrs. Smith from making their mortgage payments.
As a consequence of nonpayment, State Bank foreclosed on the loan. At
the time of the foreclosure, Mr. and Mrs. Smith owed State Bank
$190,000. The foreclosure sale brought in only $150,000, leaving a
deficiency balance of $40,000. After unsuccessful collection attempts,
State Bank discharged the $40,000 deficiency.
State Bank's discharge of the recourse liability results in discharge
indebtedness income to Mr. and Mrs. Smith equal to the amount
discharged, $40,000. Mr. and Mrs. Smith may find relief under section
108(a)(1)(E) only if the amount discharged is QPRI. Because Mr. and
Mrs. Smith used only $10,000 of the $40,000 discharged to "acquire,
construct, or substantially improve" only that amount constitutes QPRI
and may be excluded from gross income. 1 The remaining $30,000 of
174. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND EcONOMIC
GRowTH: TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 14 (1984). It states: a tax that places
significantly different burdens on taxpayers in similar economic circumstances is not fair. For
example, if two similar families have the same income, they should ordinarily pay roughly the same
amount of income tax, regardless of the sources or use of that income. A fair tax system does not
allow some taxpayers to avoid by legal means or evade them by illegal means. Id.
175. A "recourse" debt is a debt for which the debtor has personal liability. U.C.C. § 3-414(1)
(1987). The lender may obtain a personal judgment against the debtor. For examples of tax effects
of recourse liability see Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), (c) (1980).
176. "A nonrecourse liability means that the lender is not entitled to a personal judgment
against the debtor, but can only recover the property which secures the loan; thus the debtor has no
personal liability." Id. A nonrecourse debt is a "debt for which the debtor is not personally liable.
The lender is barred from action against the borrower's other assets if the security value is
insufficient to satisfy the loan." Deborah A Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge
Theory, I FLA. TAX REv. 115, 119 n.9 (1992).
177. There could be an issue concerning the order in which the different types of debt qualify
as being satisfied with the foreclosure sale. For instance, an argument could be made that the HEI
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the discharged debt represents indebtedness incurred by Mr. and Mrs.
Smith not used to "acquire, construct, or substantially improve" the
residence. Therefore, it is not QPRI and Mr. and Mrs. Smith will be
subject to an income tax on that amount.1 78  Contrast these tax
consequences to a situation in which Mr. and Mrs. Smith's debt is
nonrecourse.
If given the same facts as above, except that Mr. and Mrs. Smith
are not personally liable for the loan, the tax consequences are
completely different. In this instance, Mr. and Mrs. Smith will not have
discharge of indebtedness income. Rather, Mr. and Mrs. Smith will be
deemed to have sold the home for $190,000. In other words, the entire
debt is included in the "amount realized." 79 With an adjusted basis in
the house of $200,000, the foreclosure sale results in a $10,000 non-
deductible loss-but more importantly, it does not result in a taxable
gain!'80
This absurd and inequitable result in the two nearly identical cases
is perhaps the strongest argument as to why QPRI should be expanded to
include any indebtedness, which is secured by the home, regardless of
the use of those funds. Allowing second mortgages and HELOCs to
count as QPRI, although the funds are not used towards the home, will
prevent this type of inequity. If this hole is not filled, more homeowners
may be forced to file bankruptcy due to their increased liability on the
phantom income.
was satisfied with the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, and that the deficiency balance
represented QPRI. This argument is unlikely to be successful and will not be discussed beyond this
footnote.
178. Mr. and Mrs. Smith must also determine their gain or loss from the foreclosure sale. In
this case, the amount that they realize is $150,000, the fair market value of the house less their
adjusted basis, resulting in a non-deductible personal loss. See I.R.C. § 262(a) (2010). See also
Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(a)(2).
179. "Except as [otherwise] provided ... the amount realized from a sale or other disposition
of property includes the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of
the sale or disposition." Id. § 1.1001-2(a)(1). See also I.R.C. § 7701(g) ("In determining the
amount of gain or loss (or deemed gain or loss) with respect to any property, the fair market value
of such property shall be treated as being not less than the amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness
to which such property is subject.").
180. For an in depth look at the absurdity of the results between recourse and non-recourse
loans (or an argument as to why recourse and non-recourse loans should be given the same
treatment for purposes of sections 61 (a)(12) and 108(a)), see The Housing Decline: The Extent of
the Problem and Potential Remedies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 169
(testimony of Deborah A. Geier). It can be noted here that disparate treatment can happen the other
way around as well, with homeowners with a non-recourse having a gain after the foreclosure sale
and not being subject to section 108 because it is not discharge of indebtedness income. Though,
this is rare. In most instances, as indicated in the example, it will usually result in a non-deductible
capital loss.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the nation is going through hard economic times, taxpayers
become delinquent in their debts, resulting in debt cancellation by their
creditors. Congress appropriately responds through section 108 to
extend tax relief to the taxpayers who have been hit the hardest by the
down-turned economy: businesses during the Great Depression; farmers
during the 1980s credit crisis; and foreclosed homeowners in the housing
crisis. To the farmer, amending section 108 to exclude from gross
income discharge of "qualified farm indebtedness," allowed him to
restructure his debt and keep his farm. For the foreclosed homeowner,
amending section 108 to exclude from gross income discharges of
"qualified principal residence indebtedness" allowed him to deal with
the devastation of losing his home without the added burden of an
income tax.
However, as this article demonstrates, Congress did not go far
enough to ensure that all of the intended beneficiaries of section 108 are
actually helped. Limitations with respect to "qualified farm
indebtedness" and "qualified principal residence indebtedness" leave
some farmers and foreclosed homeowners out in the cold. As we saw in
Lawinger, a taxpayer who restructured her debt to save her farm
nonetheless faced income tax consequences from the discharge of part of
her indebtedness because she failed the "gross receipts test," which she
would have met had she sold her farm a year earlier.
Foreclosed homeowners whose homes are not sold before 2013 or
who used part of the borrowed funds for something other than
substantially improving the home, will have discharge of indebtedness
income. They will be hit by the "double whammy" Congress tried to
prevent when they passed MDRA.
Congress should take another look at section 108, in particular the
most recent provision, and make the necessary changes so that it
comports with the policy of section 108. Further, Congress should learn
through these provisions so that it can be ready to help the next taxpayer
not currently covered under section 108. As this article has shown,
history does repeat itself.
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